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Religious Freedom and Democratic Change in Spain1 
Javier Martínez-Torrón∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is probably not pretentious to assert that in the second half of 
the 1970s Spain experienced one of the most successful democratic 
transitions in history. The metamorphosis of Spain’s political system 
was achieved very efficiently, quickly, peacefully, and with the 
consensus of the vast majority of Spanish citizens and political forces. 
This is certainly unusual considering Spain’s political history, during 
which democracy had neither deep nor long-lasting roots. 
Within Spain’s turbulent twentieth century, the mid-1970s 
political reform had been preceded by thirty-six years of General 
Francisco Franco’s dictatorship, which began in 1939 after three 
years of civil war that put an end to the Second Republic.2 Shortly 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Complutense University, Madrid, Spain. Vice-President of the 
Section of Canon Law and Church-State Relations of the Spanish Royal Academy of 
Jurisprudence and Legislation. Member of the Advisory Commission on Religious Freedom 
within the Spanish Ministry of Justice. Member of the OSCE/ODIHR Advisory Council on 
Freedom of Religion or Belief. 
 1. This essay is inspired by the paper presented to the first plenary session of the 12th 
International Law and Religion Symposium: Religion and the World’s Legal Traditions, 
Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, October 2–5, 2005. Parts of its content proceed 
from the Research Project BJU2002-03813, funded by the Spanish Ministry of Education and 
Science, under the direction of Professor Rafael Navarro-Valls, Complutense University. When 
giving my oral presentation, I assumed that the people in the audience were not necessarily 
familiar with the legal analysis of church-state issues or with the Spanish system of church-state 
relations (historical and present). In writing this text, I have assumed that the same is probably 
true with regard to the potential readers of this article. This has moved me to include some 
clarifications that would normally be unnecessary were I writing for Spanish jurists. In general, 
I have preferred to restrict bibliographical and legal quotations to a minimum, indicating, in 
due course, the sources in which further references can be found. For an interesting and 
complete data base on publications related to the Spanish law on religious issues, see the 
Internet pages of the Área de Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado of the University of Almería 
(Spain), under the responsibility of Professors José María Vázquez García-Peñuela and María 
del Mar Martín, http://www.ual.es/~canonico/inicio1.html (last visited July 22, 2006).  
 2. The Second Republic was proclaimed by the provisional government of Spain on 
April 14, 1931. The military coup d’état of July 18, 1936, is usually considered to be what 
commenced the Spanish civil war. General Franco’s troops took Madrid on March 28, 1939, 
and he officially announced the end of the war a few days later, on April 1. 
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after Franco’s death in 1975,3 Spain rapidly transformed into a 
democracy, fully complying with all international standards both on 
paper and in practice.4 The most important instrument of that 
transformation, and the pillar of the subsequent development of 
Spain’s political system, was the Constitution approved by 
referendum in late 1978.5 
In this movement towards democracy, the 1980 Organic Law on 
Religious Freedom (Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa)6 played an 
essential role. It was the first enacted “organic law” to implement the 
fundamental rights recognized by the Constitution. It is important 
for Spaniards to remember this fact and to analyze its causes so as to 
not lose sight of the achievements of Spain’s recent political 
evolution and the path Spain followed to reach them. Doing so 
would risk the possibility that the contemporary political atmosphere 
would ignore, and therefore undermine, a remarkable part of the 
basis upon which Spain’s still-young democracy was built. 
Such an analysis may be interesting beyond Spain’s borders as 
well, especially because Spain’s political situation in the 1970s is not 
at all unique. Although each nation has its peculiar history and 
circumstances, the existing analogies between some countries are 
significant and justify looking at what occurred in Spain twenty-five 
years ago. I have in mind certain analogies that relate to the political 
situation in the strict sense and also those relating to other issues, 
such as socio-religious circumstances or prevailing cultural patterns. 
Naturally, it is not my intention to propose that Spain’s political 
 
 3. Franco died on November 20, 1975, after a long hospital stay. 
 4. Naturally, this does not mean that Spain’s democracy does not need to keep 
evolving, gaining consistency, and rooting in society. It is one thing to view democracy from 
the perspective of the structure and functioning of the political system, which in Spain was 
achieved in a few years, and a different thing to establish deep roots of democratic mentality 
and civic virtues in the people. The latter takes much more time and not only requires a change 
in the legal and political machinery that constitutes the framework of social life, but also a long 
and active process of educating society. 
 5. The Spanish Constitution was promulgated on December 27, 1978, after having 
been approved in referendum on December 6, 1978, by the immense majority of voters (87.78 
percent, which constituted 58.97 percent of the electoral census). A succinct and precise 
description of the elaboration process followed by the Constitution can be found in the 
Internet pages of the Congreso de los Diputados (Spanish Congress), 
http://www.congreso.es/funciones/constitucion/proceso.htm (last visited July 22, 2006). 
 6. Ley Orgánica 7/1980, July 5, 1980, de Libertad Religiosa [hereinafter LOLR]. The 
so-called “organic laws” require an absolute majority in Congress to be approved, modified, or 
abrogated. The laws governing fundamental rights and public freedoms must be organic. Cf. 
Constitución art. 81 (Spain) [hereinafter C.E.]. 
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transition or its system of church-state relations are models for all 
nations to imitate. Transplants are of dubious efficiency in 
comparative law as well as in politics. However, it is always useful to 
learn from other countries’ experiences, from their mistakes, and 
from their accomplishments. And perhaps in this sense, Spain’s 
example can be of use to other emerging democracies struggling 
with issues of religious liberty. 
II. THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE 
ORGANIC LAW ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
An adequate understanding of LOLR and the function it fulfilled 
as Spain transitioned to democracy requires that it be read in 
connection with the great document that served as the basis for the 
entire democratic process: Spain’s 1978 Constitution. It is also 
necessary to situate both norms within the context of Spain’s 
political and religious history, especially during the 20th century.7 
As is well known, the vast majority of Spain’s population, both 
traditionally and especially in the last five centuries, is Catholic.8 In 
 
 7. Among the general studies on the LOLR and on the constitutional provisions 
related to religion, it is worth mentioning two books published a few years after the 
Constitution was enacted. They contain a detailed analysis of their respective developmental 
process. See JOSÉ J. AMORÓS AZPILICUETA, LA LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA EN LA CONSTITUCIÓN 
ESPAÑOLA DE 1978 (1984); MARÍA J. CIÁURRIZ, LA LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA EN EL DERECHO 
ESPAÑOL: LA LEY ORGÁNICA DE LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA (1984). The former also contains an 
interesting historical outline of how the preceding Spanish constitutions dealt with religious 
issues. 
 8. The following paragraphs contain a succinct description of well-known facts. 
Therefore, a few general bibliographical references will suffice here (although I will cite some 
more specific studies in due course). See Pedro Lombardía, Precedentes del Derecho Eclesiástico 
Español, in DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO ESPAÑOL 151–74 (1980) for an attractive 
summary of church-state relations in Spain in the last centuries. As a larger reference book on 
the history of the Catholic Church in Spain, see the seven volumes of HISTORIA DE LA IGLESIA 
EN ESPAÑA (Ricardo García Villoslada ed., 1982). For a foreign historian’s perspective, see 
STANLEY G. PAYNE, SPANISH CATHOLICISM: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW (1984). For 
information on particular historical periods, see JOSÉ M. CUENCA TORIBIO, RELACIONES 
IGLESIA-ESTADO EN LA ESPAÑA CONTEMPORÁNEA: 1833–1985 (2d ed. 1989), and CHRISTIANS, 
MUSLIMS, AND JEWS IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN SPAIN: INTERACTION AND 
CULTURAL CHANGE (Mark D. Meyerson & Edward D. English eds., 1999). For a complete 
bibliographical reference on the history of church-state relations in Spain since its configuration 
as a modern state, see MARÍA R. ANDRÉS VERDÚ & ISABEL MENDOZA GARCÍA, LAS 
RELACIONES IGLESIA-ESTADO: SS. XV–XX (1995), which contains almost six hundred 
references. With regard to the history of Spain from a general perspective, the most complete 
reference work is the monumental HISTORIA DE ESPAÑA by Menéndez Pidal (for issues related 
to Part II of this paper, see volume 17). 
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the late fifteenth century, Spain forged its national unity together 
with its religious unity. The unity of the new nation was shortly 
followed by an ambitious enterprise: the building of an enormous 
overseas empire, in which the union between political unity and 
religious unity would exercise a decisive influence. To be a Spaniard 
and to be a Catholic were understood as equivalent; they were two 
sides of a single national identity. As a consequence, adherents of 
other religions (such as Judaism and Islam) who refused to convert 
were expelled from the kingdom. Following the same political logic, 
pseudo-converts and those who abandoned Catholicism to profess a 
heresy—particularly the doctrines of Luther or Calvin—were 
persecuted and, if they did not repent, publicly condemned at the 
hand of the Spanish Inquisition.9 This explains why, until recently, 
Protestantism was virtually nonexistent and only a few residual—and 
concealed—groups of Jews and Muslims remained in Spain. 
We should note that during the same historical period, nation-
states were constituted all over Europe following analogous 
interpretations of the principle cuius regio eius et religio (the religion 
of the prince is the religion of the nation). It is thus natural that the 
Catholic Church exercised a tremendous influence in Spain over the 
last five hundred years despite the numerous sways of Spain’s internal 
politics, which witnessed some intense episodes of anti-clericalism, 
and also despite repercussions felt in Spain from events occurring 
beyond the peninsula’s borders: from the dismantling of the 
American empire to the influx of French-style liberalism and its 
subsequent withdrawal after Napoleon Bonaparte’s Spanish 
adventure. 
From this perspective, the situation was not very different in the 
twentieth century, the beginning of which was marked by the 
disappearance of overseas Spain and by the social convulsions 
provoked by socialist and anarchist movements, which were fueled 
by circumstances of severe economic shortage. A significant part of 
twentieth century Spanish politics revolved around church-state 
relations, which oscillated between two extremes: on the one hand, a 
 
 9. I am not suggesting that the Spanish kings were determined to guarantee the 
kingdom’s religious unity under Catholicism for merely political reasons. The Spanish 
monarchy—perhaps more than other monarchies of that period—was committed to defend the 
nation’s religion largely for strictly religious reasons, at least throughout the 16th century and 
probably also into the 17th century. Proof of this intent is found in the policy the monarchs 
followed for the incorporation of the American Continent into the Kingdom of Spain. 
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confessional State (i.e., a State officially Catholic that protected, and 
somehow also controlled, the Catholic Church at the cost of the 
freedom of other religions or ideologies), and, on the other hand, an 
anti-religious, and more precisely anti-Catholic, hostility. 
We can find a clear and relevant example of the latter approach in 
the Spanish Second Republic, Spain’s last democratic experiment 
prior to the political transition of the 1970s.10 It is well-known that 
the 1931 Republican Constitution, as well as subsequent legislation 
on religious issues, adopted a resolutely anti-Catholic attitude.11 
Republican legislatures and governments, especially at the beginning 
and end of the Republic, were determined to reduce the Catholic 
Church’s social influence, which they considered excessive and 
incompatible with a democratic and secular state. They failed to 
accept the incontrovertible fact that the Church had an enormous 
weight in Spain’s social structure. Consequently, they refused to 
enact moderate legislation that could reconcile the ecclesiastical 
influence with a democratic system and, at the same time, attract the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy towards the Republican cause. As some 
scholars have pointed out, “there was something anomalous in the 
anti-religious policy of the Second Republic,” for the clergy was not 
fascist, although it was largely conservative, and peasants were not 
anti-clerical, notwithstanding the gradual de-Christianization of the 
working class.12 
It is probably true that the construction of a strong and 
democratic State would have required a readjustment of church-state 
relations and a new conception (and decrease) of the predominant 
role played by the Catholic Church in Spain’s political, cultural, and 
social life. But the Republican government went too far when 
adopting measures to reach an objective that, properly understood, 
would have been acceptable. Although it is certainly difficult to 
judge the protagonists of history from a contemporary perspective, it 
is very significant that neither the Republican Constitution’s 
 
 10. For a more detailed description with further bibliographical references, see Javier 
Martínez-Torrón, Derecho de Asociación y Confesiones Religiosas en la Constitución de 1931, in 
ESTADO Y RELIGIÓN: PROCESO DE SECULARIZACIÓN Y LAICIDAD 177–204 (Dionisio 
Llamazares ed., 2001). 
 11. For a complete and interesting study on the making of the Republican 
Constitution’s provisions on religious issues, see FERNANDO DE MEER, LA CUESTIÓN 
RELIGIOSA EN LAS CORTES CONSTITUYENTES DE LA II REPÚBLICA ESPAÑOLA (1975). 
 12. See Rafael Navarro-Valls, La Iglesia y la Guerra Civil Española, in scriptis, which I 
read thanks to the author’s courtesy. 
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provisions on religious issues nor the legislation later enacted to 
implement them would be permitted today in light of international 
documents for the protection of human rights. The paradox—a cruel 
paradox for Spaniards—is that Second Republic politicians,13 in their 
apparent eagerness to build a democratic state based upon respect for 
public freedoms (and led more by emotions than by reason), ended 
up amputating one of the most important liberties: freedom of 
religion and belief. It seems that those politicians were more 
interested in freeing the country from religion than in establishing 
the basis for freedom of religion, resembling the attitude of the 
French government of the Third Republic, especially from 1880 to 
1905.14 At times, the anti-religious obsession of some politicians 
became grotesque. This was the case, for instance, in the peculiar 
attitude shown by some leftist members of congress when the 
constituent Parliament (Cortes constituyentes) discussed equal 
electoral rights of Spanish citizens without making a distinction 
between men and women. Some leftist congressmen expressed a 
sturdy resistance to the granting of equal voting rights to women 
because they presumed that women could be more easily influenced 
by the clergy and would therefore constitute a “reactionary and anti-
republican” force.15 
In fact, the Second Republic’s lack of moderation on religious 
issues was, according to a great part of historians, one of the most 
decisive factors that triggered the civil war, which in turn led to a 
dictatorship of more than thirty-six years. During that somber 
period, Spain remained largely disconnected from the democratic 
nations of Europe that, after World War II, rebuilt their economies, 
their political life, and their cultural strength in a gradual process that 
developed alongside a series of increasingly significant supranational 
institutions. Only after Franco’s death in 1975 could Spain revive its 
connection with Europe. 
The religious policy of General Franco’s dictatorship produced, 
as a pendulum reaction against Republican extremism, an 
 
 13. This applies especially to those aligned with left-wing parties. 
 14. See in this regard, in the context of an interesting comparison between the 
constitutional principles on religion in France and in the United States, BLANDINE CHÉLINI-
PONT & JEREMY GUNN, DIEU EN FRANCE ET AUX ÉTATS-UNIS: QUAND LES MYTHES FONT 
LA LOI 25–33 (2005). 
 15. See FRANCISCO MARTÍ GILABERT, POLÍTICA RELIGIOSA DE LA SEGUNDA 
REPÚBLICA ESPAÑOLA 107–08 (1998). 
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unmistakable return to the notion of a Catholic confessional State.16 
The ecclesiastical establishment’s general acceptance and support of 
the anti-Republican forces that won the civil war was more the result 
than the cause of the violence exercised against the Church during 
the Republic.17 In any event, the Catholic Church and Franco’s 
dictatorship worked together for many years. The State declared 
itself officially Catholic (Estado confesional), and its protection of the 
Catholic Church permeated legislative and administrative praxis at all 
levels, all at the cost of freedom for other religions. Once again, to 
be a Catholic was, de facto, requisite to be “fully Spanish.” The 
mutual concession of privileges between the Catholic Church and 
the Spanish government acquired an international dimension (and 
reinforcement in domestic law) with the 1953 Concordat between 
the Holy See and the Spanish State.18 
This reciprocal support, however, did not prevent rising tensions 
between the ecclesiastical hierarchy and Franco’s regime. Tensions 
rose especially in the 1960s, partially as a consequence of the Second 
Vatican Council’s changing perspective on the relations between 
religious and civil society. Significantly, the first Spanish law on 
religious freedom, which legalized non-Catholic public religious 
worship, was enacted in 1967 (despite Franco’s own reluctance) as a 
consequence of political pressure exerted by the Holy See and by 
Spanish bishops. The position adopted by the 1967 law was surely 
insufficient according to contemporary international human rights 
standards, but the regulation of religious freedom was less restrictive 
than the regulation of other public liberties in Spain at the time.19 
 
 16. See generally Alberto de la Hera, Actitud del Franquismo ante la Iglesia, in IGLESIA 
CATÓLICA Y REGÍMENES AUTORITARIOS Y DEMOCRÁTICOS 43–70 (1987); Pedro Lombardía, 
Actitud de la Iglesia ante el Franquismo, in IGLESIA CATÓLICA Y REGÍMENES AUTORITARIOS Y 
DEMOCRÁTICOS 81–102 (1987). See also GUSTAVO SUÁREZ PERTIERRA, LIBERTAD 
RELIGIOSA Y CONFESIONALIDAD EN EL ORDENAMIENTO JURÍDICO ESPAÑOL (1978); Agustín 
Motilla, Relaciones Iglesia-Estado en la España Contemporánea, REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE 
DERECHO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE ALCALÁ DE HENARES 91 (1991). 
 17. Cf. Navarro-Valls, supra note 12. 
 18. Concordato Entre la Santa Sede y el Estado Español, August 27, 1953 (B.O.E. Oct. 
19, 1953). 
 19. For more on the 1967 Law on Religious Freedom within the historical context of 
Spanish law and politics, see MARÍA BLANCO, LA PRIMERA LEY ESPAÑOLA DE LIBERTAD 
RELIGIOSA (1999); see also Javier Tusell, El Impacto del Concilio Vaticano II en la Política y en 
la Sociedad Española, in EL POSCONCILIO EN ESPAÑA 377–90 (1988); Carlos Corral, 
Valoración Comparada de la Legislación Española de Libertad Religiosa, 24 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA 
DE DERECHO CANÓNICO 315 (1968); José R. Polo, La Significación Histórica en España del 
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III. THE SYSTEM DESIGNED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND 
THE ORGANIC LAW OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
The system of relations between state and religion designed by 
the 1978 Constitution contrasted sharply with the record of religious 
and anti-religious extremism described above. In this, as in other 
aspects of Spain’s political development, the Constitution was aimed 
at three fundamental objectives: a high degree of freedom, a broad 
consensus among the Spanish population and political parties, and a 
reasonable chance of stability, which was entirely absent in Spain’s 
previous constitutional experience. 
The new system of church-state relations lacked precedent in 
Spain’s constitutional history and represented a true Copernican 
revolution in the Spanish State’s attitude towards the role of religion 
in law and in society. This new system’s novelty consisted in rejecting 
a monochrome orientation (religious or secularist), while at the same 
time setting down a complex plane—the main coordinate of which 
was the prevailing criterion of religious freedom—and still leaving 
room for institutional relations between the State and religious 
denominations. In that way, the 1978 constitutional framework 
endeavored to neither ignore tradition nor realism and sought for 
full compatibility with international standards, particularly with the 
standard that is usually deemed most strict: the European 
Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted by its own jurisdiction, 
the European Court of Strasbourg.20 
Inspired by the experience of other European countries, the axis 
of the Spanish church-state system was comprised of four 
fundamental “informing principles” (principios informadores), which 
were developed by the Organic Law on Religious Freedom a year-
and-a-half after the 1978 Constitution was completed. A thorough 
 
Concilio Vaticano II y el Derecho de Libertad Religiosa, 89 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE 
DERECHO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE 255 (1997–1998). 
 20. With regard to religious freedom case law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
see generally CAROLYN EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2001); MALCOLM D. EVANS, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPE (1997); LEONARD M. HAMMER, THE INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE (2001); Javier Martínez-Torrón & Rafael 
Navarro-Valls, The Protection of Religious Freedom in the System of the Council of Europe, in 
FACILITATING FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF: A DESKBOOK 209–38 (Tore Lindholm, 
W. Cole Durham Jr. & Bahia G. Tahzib-Lie eds., 2004); and PAUL M. TAYLOR, FREEDOM OF 
RELIGION: UN AND EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE (2005). 
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analysis of those principles is beyond the limits of this paper, but it is 
worthwhile here to provide an overview of the principles in order to 
facilitate a better understanding of their function in the Spanish legal 
system.21 
The first principle is religious freedom. It means that all State law 
on religious issues must aim at protecting this fundamental right, 
which many international documents call “freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion,”22 and which article 16 of our Constitution 
names “freedom of ideology, religion and worship” (libertad 
ideológica, religiosa y de culto).23 I mention this principle in the first 
place not because it is necessarily in a position of hierarchical pre-
eminence with respect to the other principles, but because religious 
freedom constitutes the primary objective of the state policy in this 
realm. It is a sort of lodestar that gives sense to and delineates the 
true dimension of the other constitutional principles. These other 
principles, however, cannot be conceived simply as mere 
developments of the principle of religious freedom. On the contrary, 
the other three principles clearly define and cement the functional 
efficiency of religious liberty in Spanish legal order.24 
The second principle is equality and requires that all citizens and 
groups are equal before the law with respect to the exercise of religion 
or belief. The equality principle’s immediate consequence is that the 
same degree of freedom must be recognized for all, but it also acts as a 
limit to the general rules governing the legal position of churches in 
Spain. Thus, differences between the legal statuses of various religious 
 
 21. There are many sources that refer to the constitutional principles on religious issues 
in Spanish law. For a more detailed exposition of the ideas mentioned in the following 
paragraphs, and for further bibliographical references, see JAVIER MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, 
RELIGIÓN, DERECHO Y SOCIEDAD, ANTIGUOS Y NUEVOS PLANTEAMIENTOS EN EL DERECHO 
ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO 172–204 (1999). 
 22. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess. at art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217A (III) (Dec. 10, 1948); International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; European 
Convention on Human Rights art. 9 (1950). 
 23. We could also add the expression “freedom of religion or belief,” which has been 
gaining ground since the 1981 UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance 
and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, especially within the OSCE environment. 
With regard to the conceptual questions implied in the use of that diverse terminology, see 
MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, supra, note 21, at 126–39. 
 24. See Javier Ferrer Ortiz, Los Principios Constitucionales del Derecho Eclesiástico como 
Sistema, in LAS RELACIONES ENTRE LA IGLESIA Y EL ESTADO: ESTUDIOS EN MEMORIA DEL 
PROFESOR PEDRO LOMBARDÍA 309–22 (1989). 
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denominations are legitimate only if they are not the result of 
discrimination. Such differences are allowed only if it is necessary for a 
specific legal treatment to be adjusted to the particular circumstances of 
a particular group. In other words, according to the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights and of the Spanish Constitutional 
Court, the differences that are legitimate are those which correspond to 
a reasonable and objective justification, pursue a legitimate aim, and 
maintain a correct relationship of proportionality between the aim 
pursued and the means employed.25 Equality is perhaps the principle 
most difficult to apply in practice—in this, as in other areas of 
constitutional law—for there is not always a clear border marking the 
end of what is open to the discretion of public authorities and the 
beginning of what is obliged by law. 
The third principle is that of state neutrality26 on religious matters 
and appears to be the main instrument chosen by the Constitution to 
protect the religious liberty of all citizens and groups in equal 
conditions. Neutrality requires that the State and its legal system 
perceive themselves as incompetent with regard to purely religious 
questions and therefore unable to make value judgments on them. 
However, it does not mean that civil authorities declare themselves 
indifferent towards the results of freedom of religion or belief, or that 
they withdraw completely from the content of personal choices in this 
 
 25. The case law of the Spanish Constitutional Court is directly inspired by the case law 
of the Court of Strasbourg. The first decision of the European Court of Human Rights 
establishing its doctrine on equality was the so-called “linguistic Belgian case”: Case “relating 
to certain aspects on the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium” v. Belgium (July 
23, 1968), especially in ‘The Law’ n.1.B.10. The European Court has subsequently reiterated 
this doctrine in numerous decisions, including some relating to religious freedom. See Javier 
Martínez-Torrón, La Protección Internacional de la Libertad Religiosa, in TRATADO DE 
DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO 229–37 (1994). For an explanation of the principle of equality in the 
case law of the Constitutional Court of Spain, see JOAQUÍN CALVO ÁLVAREZ, LOS PRINCIPIOS 
DEL DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO ESPAÑOL EN LAS SENTENCIAS DEL TRIBUNAL 
CONSTITUCIONAL 129–64 (1999); see also RAFAEL RODRÍGUEZ CHACÓN, EL FACTOR 
RELIGIOSO ANTE EL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL 33–38 (1992). 
 26. Some scholars prefer the terms ‘laicity” (laicidad, laïcité) or “aconfessionality.” The 
use of one or the other term implies certain differences with regard to how the meaning of this 
principle is understood. Personally, I prefer the expression “neutrality,” which I deem more 
appropriate to avoid misunderstandings with respect to its content. See JAVIER MARTÍNEZ-
TORRÓN, supra note 21. For a discussion on state neutrality and its connections with the 
notion of religious freedom and with the very notion of person, see the interesting remarks 
written, in the light of German jurisprudence, by María J. Roca, La Neutralidad del Estado: 
Fundamento Doctrinal y Delimitación en la Jurisprudencia, in I IL DIRITTO ECCLESIASTICO 
405 (1997). 
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particular area of human rationality. Neutrality means that when the 
State acts with respect to diverse religions, it may take into account 
only the social effects of the religious activity, including the cases in 
which those effects conflict with values that the legal order considers 
necessary. 
Finally, the principle of state cooperation with churches or religious 
communities provides a specific profile to neutrality. State and churches 
enjoy, of course, reciprocal autonomy.27 Nevertheless, this autonomy is 
not understood in terms of strict separation but rather in terms of 
amicable relations and mutual cooperation (at least, cooperation of the 
State with religious denominations). This principle poses an interesting 
and difficult question: to what extent may a concrete measure of State 
cooperation with churches depend on each church’s cooperation with 
the State (not, of course, with a particular government)? Or, in other 
words, may State cooperation depend upon a religious community’s 
loyalty to the constitutional values of a democratic State? This issue is 
closely connected to the relationship between what German scholars 
have called Rechtstreue and Staatstreue (fidelity to the law and fidelity 
to the State).28 In any event, two aspects of the principle of 
cooperation seem indisputable: first, the Constitution imposes on the 
State a general duty to cooperate with religion, according to “the 
beliefs of Spanish society”;29 and second, State cooperation with 
 
 27. Naturally, not only is the state autonomous with regard to religion—no matter how 
widespread it is in society—but also religious communities are autonomous with respect to the 
state. The European Court of Human Rights has often emphasized this idea in recent years, 
especially in the decisions Serif v. Greece (Dec. 14, 1999), Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, 511 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 26 (Oct. 2000), Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldavia (Dec. 2001), 
and Agga v. Greece (Oct. 17, 2002). For a further explanation of this doctrine, see Javier 
Martínez-Torrón, Limitations on Religious Freedom in the Case Law of the European Court of 
Human Rights, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 587 (2005). 
 28. This issue was analyzed by the German Constitutional Court in a decision made on 
December 19, 2000, relating to the requirements that Jehovah’s Witnesses had to meet to be 
granted the status of “public law corporation.” BverfGE 102, 370 Nr. 17 (F.R.G.). See 
Christian Hillgruber, Der Körperschaftsstatus von Religionsgemeinschaften: Objektives 
Grundverhältnis oder subjektives Grundrecht, in NVWZ 1347 (2001); Alexander Hollerbach, 
Anmerkung, in JZ 1117 (1997); Stefan Korioth, Loyalität im Staatskirchenrecht? Geschriebene 
und ungeschriebene Voraussetzungen des Körperschaftsstatus nach Art. 140 GG i.V.m. Art. 137 
Abs. 5 WRV, in RECHTSTHEORIE UND RECHTSDOGMATIK IM AUSTAUSCH. 
GEDÄCHTNISSCHRIFT FÜR BERND JEAND’HEUR 221–45 (1999); Gerhard Robbers, Sinn und 
Zweck der Körperschaftsstatus im Staatskirchenrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR MARTIN HECKEL 
411–25 (1999). 
 29. C.E., supra note 6, art. 16(3). 
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churches probably allows a certain margin of appreciation for public 
authorities, albeit limited by the principles of equality and neutrality. 
IV. THREE KEY ASPECTS OF THE SPANISH TRANSITION 
I would now like to emphasize three aspects of the 
reconstruction process of church-state relations during Spain’s 
transition to democracy that should not be forgotten. They are 
significant not only to duly evaluate the meaning of the political 
change of the 1970s, but they also can continue to shed light on the 
possible future development of the Spanish church-state system. 
A. The Support of Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 
I have already noted that the renovation of the Spanish model of 
relations between state and religion was essential for the success of 
Spain’s democratic evolution. A large part of this success was due to 
the support that the vast majority of Spanish bishops gave to the 
political change.30 
The triumph and subsequent consolidation of democracy in 
Spain required, as an indispensable condition, a situation of 
“religious peace,” which could be reached only by careful avoidance 
of extreme solutions. Otherwise, there was the risk that fears of a 
“new Second Republic” would condemn Spain again to a period of 
political stagnation of one color or other. The representatives of 
those political positions barred during Franco’s regime had a 
responsibility to keep away from encouraging the same sentiments of 
requital that so easily emerged in the Republican Constitution and 
laws. This was well understood by some politicians who had been 
witnesses—and even protagonists—of the Republican excesses and 
their tragic results in 1936.31 
 
 30. In addition to the reference works cited in note 8, a detailed description of the 
attitude of the Catholic Church in those years, with numerous references to news in mass 
media, can be found in AMORÓS AZPILICUETA, supra note 7, at 74–87, 99–111. 
 31. This explains the attitude of Santiago Carrillo, who was the Secretary General of the 
Spanish Communist Party while the Constitution was being debated in Parliament. He had 
been directly involved in some serious revolutionary episodes in 1934 and had held the 
position of “commissary of public order” within the Republic’s Committee of Defense during 
the civil war. Carrillo, during the parliamentary debates, expressed his support of the explicit 
mention of the Catholic Church in art. 16 of the Constitution (while the Socialist Party argued 
against it). He considered that mentioning the Church did not confer improperly any privilege 
nor set the basis for a sort of “sociological confessionality” of the state. It simply recognized 
the incontestable social fact that the vast majority of the population professed Catholicism, 
MARTINEZ-TORRON.PP2 9/12/2006 8:23:18 AM 
777] Religious Freedom in Spain 
 789 
But above all, the Catholic Church in Spain had the 
responsibility to understand—and to help a large part of the 
population and many influential elements of society understand—
that the end of the State’s Catholic confessionality would not 
necessarily provoke a pendulum movement in the opposite direction, 
which could lead (as it did in the 1930s) to the hostility of public 
authorities towards the Church. The influence of ecclesiastical 
hierarchy and institutions was then, even more than now, 
extraordinarily extensive and intense. Their comprehension and 
acceptance of the new design of relations between state and religion 
was indispensable for at least two reasons. On the one hand, it was 
essential because without the ecclesiastical hierarchy’s collaboration, 
it would have been impossible to reach the “religious peace” 
required for the political consensus that Spain’s democratic transition 
needed. On the other hand, it was similarly essential because the 
hierarchy and Church institutions supported the democratic process 
itself and presented it to Catholics as something not merely 
inevitable, but actually positive, for Spain. This was especially 
important since a significant part of the vital forces of Spanish 
society, including a large percentage of high ranking Army officers, 
were not sympathetic to the political change, and, for several years, 
the future of Spain’s democracy was not completely secure, as the 
failed coup d’état of February 23, 1981, demonstrated. 
The immense majority of social and political forces accepted 
almost unconditionally the new legal framework of religious freedom 
in Spain. This support was aided by the unambiguous assent of the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy, which had been tranquillized by the 
negotiation of a new concordat during the parliamentary debates on 
the Constitution. This assent was of utmost importance for a 
political transition which was as peaceful as it was natural; indeed, 
surprisingly natural, in view of Spain’s turbulent political past up to 
that point. 
It is also worth noting that the active cooperation of the Catholic 
Church in Spain during that decisive time was not the mere product 
of political convenience nor the result of resigned submission to an 
inexorable destiny. On the contrary, it had profound roots in the 
 
while at the same time tranquillizing the ecclesiastical hierarchy and helping to remove the 
‘ghosts of the past,’ which had been revived in the course of the constitutional debate in 
Parliament. See AMORÓS AZPILICUETA, supra note 7, at 128–33. 
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renewal of Catholic doctrine regarding relations between the Church 
and civil society, which began taking shape during the Second 
Vatican Council and materialized in the Declaration Dignitatis 
Humanae. This was the same doctrinal renovation that drove the 
enactment of the first Spanish law on religious freedom during 
Franco’s dictatorship in 1967.32 
B. Consideration of Religion as a Positive Social Phenomenon 
As indicated before, our constitutional system of church-state 
relations understands state neutrality not as a strict separation, but 
rather as compatible with an affirmative cooperation with religion. 
This is no anomaly. On the contrary, it is a frequent choice—with 
various nuances—in the European panorama, with the exceptions of 
France and Turkey (due to particular historical circumstances of the 
two countries).33 
It is not my intention to analyze the consequences of the 
principle of State cooperation at political and legal levels. But I 
would like to draw attention to the fact that the principle of 
cooperation implies two presuppositions with respect to the way that 
the Constitution conceives public authorities’ attitudes towards 
religion. 
First, religion is appreciated as a positive social phenomenon. It is 
primarily considered a reality that contributes more to the 
improvement of society than to conflict or social concern (although, 
sometimes, some religions are conflictive). This perception is based 
on the fact that institutionalized religions, in addition to expressing 
the exercise of a fundamental right, actually play a positive role in 
society, which is visible in different domains.34 These include some 
areas that are not easily quantifiable, in particular the development of 
civic virtues. To be a good citizen requires a high degree of ethical 
 
 32. See supra part II. 
 33. For a succinct and expressive description of the diverse church-state systems in the 
European Union, see STATE AND CHURCH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Gerhard Robbers ed., 
2d ed. 2005). 
 34. See generally, for instance, from diverse perspectives, Rafael Navarro-Valls, Justicia 
constitucional y factor religioso, in LA LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA Y DE CONCIENCIA ANTE LA JUSTICIA 
CONSTITUCIONAL 25, 25–38 (Javier Martínez-Torrón ed., 1998); SALVATORE BERLINGÒ, ENTI E 
BENI RELIGIOSI IN ITALIA 21 (1992); ANTONIO VITALE, CORSO DI DIRITTO ECCLESIASTICO 
ORDINAMENTO GIURIDICO E INERESSI RELIGIOSI 8, 28 (6th ed. 1992); and, within the context of 
a critical revision of the judicial interpretation of U.S. Establishment Clause, Mary A. Glendon & 
Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1991). 
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quality in a wide range of aspects: from the moral individual 
obligation to abide by the law, to a variety of manifestations of what 
today is usually called solidarity. Religions normally provide 
motivations for individual moral development that transcend 
material reality and that tend to be, in practice, quite efficient 
(sometimes probably more efficient than the sole fear of an often 
infrequent legal penalty). 
Moreover, the positive social function of religion embraces other 
more quantifiable aspects. It is sufficient to note that the vast 
majority of non-governmental organizations are of direct or indirect 
religious inspiration. This is no surprise; initiatives of social assistance 
founded upon Christian charity, or upon its equivalent in other 
religions, attract many more people than mere altruism without a 
clear spiritual basis, no matter how sophisticated altruism’s 
intellectual elaboration may be.35 
As a consequence of what I have suggested in the preceding 
paragraphs, the second presupposition of the principle of State 
cooperation is that religion is accepted as a “normal” element of 
public life. To profess either religious or non-religious belief is not 
merely a private affair of citizens. Institutionalized religions, whose 
rights are founded on individual rights to religious freedom, are 
entitled to express and spread their ideas in the public square, in 
every sphere of human activity—from education, culture, or science, 
to non-profit activities, mass media, and even politics. This is, of 
course, compatible with the Spanish Constitutional Court’s 
reasonable doctrine concerning the need to carefully avoid any 
confusion between state and religious functions.36 Assuming there is 
no such confusion, the prevailing criterion will be the right of 
individual citizens and of religious denominations to manifest their 
religion or their belief “in public or private.”37 Generally, this is not 
 
 35. This is a theme that has not always drawn the attention it deserves—something 
which is paradoxical in Western societies, increasingly concerned about fostering solidarity with 
persons or minority groups in physically, culturally, or socially disadvantageous situations. It is 
worth noting that this concern for fostering solidarity, in turn, derives from an ethical interest 
with clear religious roots. The perspective of law and economics would help to illuminate the 
strictly secular reasons for the principle of State cooperation with religion and the legal 
application of this principle. It would be extremely interesting to have consistent and detailed 
studies on the impact of religion on economy (or, to be precise, on the money that religions 
save the welfare State). 
 36. Cf. Spanish Constitutional Court, STC, May 13, 1982 (S.T.C., No. 24). 
 37. Cf. European Convention on Human Rights art. 9(1) (1950). This raises an issue 
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difficult to accept in the abstract. Many of the occasional interpretive 
problems in its practical application come from an erroneous 
identification between the terms “public” and “state,” which leads to 
an improper attribution to the State of a sort of monopoly over the 
control of public life. 
C. Regulation of Specific Instruments for State Cooperation 
When the LOLR developed article 16 of the Constitution in 
1980, it went beyond designing a common legal framework for all 
religions in Spain that included a special registry for recognizing the 
legal personality of religious groups.38 The law also created specific 
instruments to materialize State cooperation with religious 
denominations in accordance with a prudent interpretation of the 
equality principle. One such instrument is the Advisory Commission 
on Religious Freedom (Comisión Asesora de Libertad Religiosa),39 a 
consultative body within the Ministry of Justice that integrates 
representatives of religious communities with officials of different 
State departments and with renowned experts (most often, in 
practice, university professors). Other, even more significant 
instruments are the formal cooperation agreements or covenants 
between the State and churches (acuerdos o convenios de 
cooperación).40 These agreements constitute an innovation of the 
utmost importance that is without precedent in Spanish law but was 
 
that has acquired increasing significance not only in Spain but also in the entire Western world: 
the use of religious symbols in public spaces. This is an extremely complex issue, as 
demonstrated by the two decisions of the European Court of Human Rights for the case Leyla 
Sahin v. Turkey on June 29, 2004 (Chamber) and Nov. 10, 2005 (Grand Chamber) (the case 
relates to the Turkish prohibition to wear the Islamic headscarf at a university). See Natan 
Lerner, How Wide the Margin of Appreciation? The Turkish Headscarf Case, the Strasbourg 
Court, and Secularist Tolerance, 13 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RES. 65 (2005); see also 
StrasbourgConference.org, http://www.strasbourgconference.org/papers.php (containing 
various papers relating to the use of religious symbols in public places) (last visited July 22, 
2006). For a precise and recent analysis of the many aspects of the issue of religious symbols in 
Spanish and comparative law, see SANTIAGO CAÑAMARES, LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA, SIMBOLOGÍA 
Y LAICIDAD DEL ESTADO (2005). 
 38. This refers to the Registry of Religious Entities, which was created by LOLR art. 5 
and regulated by the Royal Decree 142/1981, Jan. 9, 1981 (sobre organización y 
funcionamiento del Registro de Entidades Religiosas). 
 39. See LOLR, supra note 6, art. 8. The Commission is currently regulated by the Royal 
Decree 1159/2001, Oct. 26, 2001 (por el que se regula la Comisión Asesora de Libertad 
Religiosa). 
 40. LOLR, supra note 6, art. 7. 
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instead inspired by German and Italian law and created as a 
consequence of the maintenance of the Spanish tradition of 
concordats after the 1978 Constitution. 
In Spain, concordats with the Catholic Church have a history 
that dates back to the eighteenth century. The main milestones were 
the Concordats of 1753,41 1851, and 1953.42 Initially, they were 
conceived—in the context of a Catholic monarchy of regalist 
orientation—as a formal channel for the reciprocal concession of 
privileges between Church and State, with a particular emphasis on 
the right of patronage (ius patronatus) and on the regulation of 
ecclesiastical offices and benefices. With the passage of time, 
concordats evolved toward a bilateral norm, always with the rank of 
an international treaty and aimed at determining more 
comprehensively the legal status of the Catholic Church in Spain. 
This is clearly visible in the Concordat of 1953, in which we can still 
observe the protectionist attitude of the State and the Church’s 
disposition to grant concessions in ecclesiastical matters. 
The Concordat signed under Franco’s regime could have been 
appropriate for a State that was confessional (officially Catholic) and 
non-democratic, but it could not be maintained in a State toward 
which Spain’s political transition was moving. Both the government 
and the Church soon felt the need to replace the 1953 Concordat. 
Thus, an Agreement between the Holy See and the Spanish State 
was signed on July 28, 1976, hardly a few months after Francisco 
Franco’s death in November of 1975. The Agreement’s preamble 
was very expressive, indicating, 
 
 
 41. As precedents within the 18th century, we could cite the Agreement of 1717 and 
the Concordat of 1737. Both were soon abandoned for not fully satisfying the interests of the 
Spanish Crown. 
 42. See JUAN PÉREZ ALHAMA, LA IGLESIA Y EL ESTADO ESPAÑOL: ESTUDIO HISTÓRICO 
A TRAVÉS DEL CONCORDATO DE 1851 (1967); Juan L. Acebal Luján, El Concordato de 1953, 
21 SALMANTENSIS 353 (1974); José Maldonado & Fernández del Torco, Los primeros años de 
vigencia del Concordato de 1953, 12 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO CANÓNICO 7 (1957); 
Isidoro Martín Martínez, En el segundo centenario del Concordato español de 1753, 8 REVISTA 
ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO CANÓNICO 745 (1953); María E. Buqueras Segura, Posición del 
Episcopado español ante la revisión del Concordato de 1953, 45 IUS CANONICUM 367 (1983); 
Federico Suárez, Génesis del Concordato de 1851, III IUS CANONICUM 65 (1963). Other 
interesting works are the collective volumes EL CONCORDATO DE 1953 (1956) and LA 
INSTITUCIÓN CONCORDATARIA EN LA ACTUALIDAD: TRABAJOS DE LA XIII SEMANA DE 
DERECHO CANÓNICO (1971). 
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The Holy See and the Spanish Government, in view of the 
profound process of transformation that Spanish society has 
experienced in the last years, also with respect to relationships 
between the political community and religious denominations as 
well as between the Catholic Church and the State . . . judge it 
necessary to regulate, through specific Agreements, the matters of 
common interest that require a new order according to the new 
circumstances arisen after the signature of the Concordat of 27 
August 1953; and therefore they agree to undertake in common 
the study of those diverse matters with the purpose of reaching, as 
soon as possible, the conclusion of Agreements that replace 
gradually the relevant provisions of the Concordat currently in 
force.43 
This text shows that neither the Church nor the State questioned 
that church-state relations should be governed by a concordat. What 
they had in mind was the need to design a new juridical bilateral 
framework, compatible with the constitutional principles that, after 
their elaboration in Parliament, would constitute the basis for the 
new Spanish democracy according to the December 1978 
Constitution. Indeed, the Agreement of 1976 suppressed the two 
main privileges that symbolized the church-state relations pervading 
the Concordat of 1953: the benefit of clergy, on the part of the 
Church, and the right of presentation of bishops, on the part of the 
State.44 Above all, this early and partial Agreement was the opening 
of negotiations that, carried out in parallel with the drafting of the 
Constitution in Parliament, would conclude with the signature of 
four specific Agreements—which together form a concordat—on 
January 3, 1979, one week after the Constitution was promulgated.45 
 
 43. Acuerdo sobre renuncia a la presentación de obispos y al privilegio del fuero, July 28, 
1976 (Instrumento de ratificación of Aug. 19, 1976, B.O.E. Sept. 24, 1976). The transcribed 
excerpt of the preamble has been translated by the author from the original Spanish version. 
 44. The benefit of clergy has a very ancient origin and consisted in the exemption of 
clerics from criminal prosecution in the secular courts without the previous authorization of 
the relevant bishop. For the history of this institution in English and American law, see 
GEORGE W. DALZELL, BENEFIT OF CLERGY IN AMERICA & RELATED MATTERS (1955) and 
LEONA C. GABEL, BENEFIT OF CLERGY IN ENGLAND IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES (1929). 
The right of presentation of bishops given to Franco was reminiscent of the old right of 
patronage of the Spanish monarchy. The Holy See agreed that, when a diocese became vacant, 
the new bishop had to be appointed out of three names provided by the government. This 
system obliged negotiation of every appointment of residential bishops in Spain and granted 
the government the possibility of vetoing certain persons for being politically objectionable. 
 45. See Beatriz Castillo, El proceso de revisión del Concordato de 1953, in ESCRITOS EN 
HONOR DE JAVIER HERVADA 971, 971–85 (special vol. of IUS CANONICUM 1999); JUAN 
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The framework created by the 1979 concordat thus constituted 
the first juridical materialization of the constitutional principle of 
State cooperation with religion. This initial experience was closely 
linked to Spanish political and legal tradition. And the same 
experience, interpreted from the perspective of the principles of 
equality and neutrality, would move the legislature a year-and-a-half 
later to introduce into the LOLR a significant and innovative 
element in Spain’s traditional system of sources of law. An adapted 
version of the concordats with the Catholic Church was made 
available to other religious denominations.46 The 1980 LOLR took, 
as a point of reference, the analogous pre-existing institutions in 
German and Italian law (the Kirchenverträge and the intese, 
respectively), and added a few nuances. The most important is 
perhaps the element of “well-known roots” (notorio arraigo), which 
is the key criterion employed to determine the religious 
denominations that may be entitled to a formal cooperation 
agreement with the State because of their social rooting.47 
If we look at the twenty-five years since the enactment of the 
LOLR, we may perhaps think that cooperation agreements have 
been an under-utilized institution thus far. Only three agreements 
have been concluded, with three federations of religious 
communities: Protestant, Jewish, and Islamic. All of them, each very 
similar in content, were approved by statute on November 10, 
1992.48 Moreover, neither the history of the negotiation process49 
 
FORNÉS, EL NUEVO SISTEMA CONCORDATARIO ESPAÑOL: LOS ACUERDOS DE 1976 Y 1979 
(1980); José M. Vázquez García-Peñuela, Examen de las relaciones entre la Santa Sede y el 
Estado Español: desde el Concordato de 1953 a los acuerdos de 1979, in PLURALISMO RELIGIOSO 
Y ESTADO DE DERECHO 89, 89–161 (2004); Daniel Tirapu, Acuerdos Iglesia-Estado en España, 
in EUROPA: UNA REALIDAD EN CAMINO 185, 185–208 (1991). 
 46. See JAVIER MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, SEPARATISMO Y COOPERACIÓN EN LOS ACUERDOS 
DEL ESTADO CON LAS MINORÍAS RELIGIOSAS 20–36 (1994). 
 47. The expression “well-known roots” is an approximate translation of the Spanish 
term notorio arraigo, which is utilized by LOLR art. 7. For possible meanings of this new and 
peculiar concept of Spanish law, see MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, supra note 46, at 88–95; see also 
María J. Villa Robledo, Reflexiones en torno al concepto de ‘notorio arraigo’ en el art. 7 de la Ley 
Orgánica de libertad religiosa, 1 ANUARIO DE DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO 143 
(1985). 
 48. See 24/1992, Nov. 10, 1992 (Federación de Entidades Religiosas Evangélicas de España, 
FEREDE); 25/1992, Nov. 10, 1992 (Federación de Comunidades Israelitas de España, FCI); 
26/1992, Nov. 10, 1992 (Comisión Islámica de España, CIE); see also DAVID GARCÍA-PARDO, 
EL SISTEMA DE ACUERDOS CON LAS CONFESIONES MINORITARIAS EN ESPAÑA E ITALIA 
(1999); JOAQUÍN MANTECÓN, LOS ACUERDOS DEL ESTADO CON LAS CONFESIONES 
ACATÓLICAS: TEXTOS, COMENTARIOS Y BIBLIOGRAFÍA (1995); AGUSTÍN MOTILLA, LOS 
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nor the criteria for determining the notion of “well-know roots” for 
legal purposes50 casts much light on the future of this institution in 
our legal system. An analogous ambiguity permeates governmental 
decisions on subsequent applications for recognition of “well-known 
roots,” which is an indispensable legal requirement to initiate the 
negotiation of a cooperation agreement with the State. Indeed, apart 
from the federations that were parties in the 1992 Agreements, only 
two religious denominations have obtained this recognition, and 
they have had to wait a long time for it in spite of their large number 
of followers and of their spreading all over Spanish territory: the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and the Church of the 
Christian Jehovah's Witnesses.51 
In spite of these possible deficiencies, the prompt signature of 
the Concordat with the Holy See after the approval of the 1978 
Constitution has had a positive influence on the legal status of 
religious minorities. This fact, although pointed out by some 
scholars soon after the LOLR was enacted,52 has been disregarded in 
the last years in an atmosphere often inundated by minority 
religions’ spiral of claims alleging inequality. The 1979 Concordat 
did not imply the continuation of unjustified privileges in favor of 
the Catholic Church and to the detriment of other churches. On the 
contrary, it contributed to a broad interpretation of the 
 
ACUERDOS ENTRE EL ESTADO Y LAS CONFESIONES RELIGIOSAS EN EL DERECHO ESPAÑOL 
(1985); Jorge Otaduy, Los Proyectos de acuerdo de cooperación con las Iglesias evangélicas y las 
comunidades israelitas, in QUADERNI DI DIRITTO E POLITICA ECCLESIASTICA 138 (1991–
1992); ANTONIO VIANA, LOS ACUERDOS CON LAS CONFESIONES RELIGIOSAS Y EL PRINCIPIO 
DE IGUALDAD (1985); ACUERDOS DEL ESTADO ESPAÑOL CON CONFESIONES RELIGIOSAS 
MINORITARIAS (Víctor Reina & María A. Félix eds., 1996); ACUERDOS DEL ESTADO ESPAÑOL 
CON LOS JUDÍOS, MUSULMANES Y PROTESTANTES (1994). 
 49. See ANA FERNÁNDEZ-CORONADO, ESTADO Y CONFESIONES RELIGIOSAS: UN 
NUEVO MODELO DE RELACIÓN: (LOS PACTOS CON LAS CONFESIONES: LEYES 24, 25 Y 26 DE 
1992) (1995) (explaining the negotiations surrounding the Agreements of 1992). 
 50. Significantly, the Council of State (Consejo de Estado), in its opinion about the draft 
agreements delivered to the Ministry of Justice on January 31, 1991 (consideración jurídica I), 
expressed its regret for the fact that the government had not provided any explanation on the 
criteria utilized for the recognition of “well-known roots” to the three religious federations. 
 51. The Ministry of Justice’s Advisory Commission on Religious Freedom recognized 
the “well-known roots” of the LDS Church on April 23, 2003. The same commission 
recognized the "well-know roots" of Jehovah's Witnesses on June 29, 2006, by a very tight 
decision and after a controverted debate, in part caused by the unclear role that this sort of 
recognition has to play—and is playing—in Spanish law. 
 52. See Pedro J. Viladrich, Los principios informadores del Derecho eclesiástico español, in 
DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO ESPAÑOL 292 (1980). 
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constitutional principle of cooperation that has been beneficial for at 
least some religious minorities. In other words, the Concordat was 
the crucial factor that moved LOLR’s drafters to extend to other 
religious communities the possibility of regulating their basic legal 
status with a bilateral instrument similar to the concordats,53 which 
had been for more than two centuries exclusively available to the 
Catholic Church. Thus, rather than perpetuating inequalities 
between the major church and minority churches, the post-
constitutional continuation of concordats in Spain helped create a 
specific channel of State cooperation: formal agreements between 
State and religious denominations, which imply an open process of 
legislative negotiation. In practice, this channel has produced a great 
deal of State cooperation with a plurality of religious minorities (an 
open plurality, not a closed list) that perhaps would have been 
inconceivable without the precedent of the 1979 Concordat with the 
Catholic Church.54 
In effect, the application of LOLR article 7 in 1992 to the 
federations of Protestant, Jewish, and Islamic communities put 
various modes of State cooperation at the disposal of religious 
minorities with particular rooting in Spain, thus making their legal 
status not very dissimilar to that of the Catholic Church. This is 
positive considering that State cooperation, in reality, constitutes a 
way to promote the right to religious freedom of “individuals and 
communities.”55 This, in turn, fits perfectly within the constitutional 
mandate given to public authorities by article 9 of the Constitution, 
which attempts to “promote the necessary conditions to ensure that 
the liberty and equality of individuals and of the groups in which 
they integrate may be real and effective,” and to “remove the 
obstacles that prevent or hinder their full exercise.”56 
Among these aspects of State cooperation, it is worth briefly 
mentioning the following here: 
 
 53. See CIÁURRIZ, supra note 7, at 168–70. 
 54. See Javier Martínez-Torrón, Concordato, cooperación e igualdad: La cooperación del 
Estado español con las confesiones religiosas a la luz del vigente sistema de acuerdos con la Iglesia 
católica, in LOS CONCORDATOS: PASADO Y FUTURO 471, 471–88 (J.M. Vázquez García-
Peñuela ed., 2004). 
 55. C.E., supra note 6, art. 16(1) (author’s translation). 
 56. Id. art. 9(2). 
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1. Civil effects of religious marriage 
The law recognizes the civil effects of a religious marriage of 
denominations with a cooperation agreement; there are some 
differences between Catholic marriage and other types of religious 
marriage.57 The main difference is that the decisions of the Catholic 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction on the nullity or dissolution of marriages are 
given civil effects, while similar effects are not granted to other 
religious jurisdictions in Spain. Naturally, the civil effects of the 
religious regulation of marriage are subject to the limitations derived 
from public order (which tend to be less and less significant because 
of the evolution of Spanish law on marriage and family, which has 
apparently moved toward a gradual privatization of the contract of 
civil marriage).58 
2. Religious education in public schools 
Confessional teaching of religion in public schools also varies 
when we compare Catholic religious education with Protestant, 
Jewish, or Islamic education, although there is a trend towards their 
gradual convergence following the pattern applicable to the Catholic 
Church (which is itself under reform). Religious education has been 
one of the most conflictive issues between the ecclesiastical hierarchy 
and the Spanish government in the last twenty-five years, with 
different levels of political tension depending on the government. 
This is due in part to the terms of the 1979 Agreement on 
Education and Cultural Affairs between the Holy See and the 
Spanish State. It is also due in part to the attitude of some 
governments, which have at times emphasized the merely “private” 
nature of religious education, neither realizing its social contribution 
from a secular perspective (beyond the obvious interest the churches 
have in it) nor sufficiently perceiving the implications of this issue 
 
 57. See MARIANO LÓPEZ ALARCÓN & RAFAEL NAVARRO-VALLS, CURSO DE DERECHO 
MATRIMONIAL CANÓNICO Y CONCORDADO 445–515 (6th ed. 2001) (providing precise and 
detailed analysis of the civil effects of religious marriage in Spanish law). 
 58. A particularly significant step in this direction has been taken recently with the 
enactment of the controversial Law 13/2005, July 1, 2005 (por la que se modifica el Código 
Civil en materia de derecho a contraer matrimonio), which eliminates heterosexuality as a 
necessary element of marriage. Naturally, this law, and the arguments alleged for its enactment, 
paves the way for other conceptions or public order in the area of marriage that are still more 
restrictive; conceptions that, for instance, would suppress the limitations deriving from 
monogamy or from the traditional prohibition of incestuous marriages. 
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with regard to parents’ constitutional right to ensure that “their 
children receive a religious and moral formation in accordance with 
their own beliefs.”59 The discrepancies between the Bishops’ 
Conference and the current socialist government undermine the 
possibility of reaching a clear and prompt social consensus on this 
issue. On the other hand, with regard in particular to the religious 
teaching of Muslim students in public centers, the specter of a 
potential infiltration of Islamic extremism has recently added an 
element of distrust and social tension in this area.60 
3. Religious assistance in public centers such as military quarters, 
hospitals, penitentiaries, retirement homes, or asylums 
Once again, we find here a few differences between Catholic 
religious assistance and other religions’ assistance, which are justified 
by the very unequal percentages of the population that declare 
themselves believers of certain religions. It does not seem feasible to 
apply to all religious denominations the same scheme of permanent 
Catholic Chaplaincies, but, at the same time, the system designed to 
facilitate the assistance of the faithful of those religions included in 
the 1992 Agreements’ system is certainly underdeveloped. Indeed, 
for years the Ministry of Justice has been searching for a more 
adequate solution to serve its purpose more efficiently than the 
current system of “free access” and “free exit” (whereby religious 
ministers may freely enter public centers when their spiritual 
assistance is required, and, when appropriate, people in military 
 
 59. C.E., supra note 6, art. 27(3) (author’s translation). 
 60. For a brief but clear description and analysis of the questions raised by religious 
education in Spain, see Àlex Seglers Gómez-Quintero, Religious Education in the Spanish 
School System, 46 J. CHURCH & ST. 561 (2004) and Javier Martínez-Torrón, School and 
Religion in Spain, 47 J. CHURCH & ST. 133 (2005). The situation became more conflictive 
after the Spanish Congress approved the Organic Law on Education (Ley Orgánica de la 
Educación) on April 6, 2006, which was proposed by our current government and rejected the 
amendments introduced by the Senate, which were aimed at restoring the religious education 
system established by the preceding legislature, contained in the Organic Law 10/2002, Dec. 
12, 2002 (de Calidad de la Educación), which was never put into practice because the current 
government suspended its application as soon as it came to power. While the draft law was 
discussed at the Congress in its first stage, there was a strong popular reaction against it, visibly 
expressed in a massive demonstration held in Madrid on November 12, 2005. The text 
approved by the Senate can be found in BOLETÍN OFICIAL DE LAS CORTES GENERALES–
SENADO, serie II, núm. 38(f), 513–89 (Mar. 30, 2006). The final discussion by the Congress, 
and the reasons alleged to reject the Senate’s amendments, can be found in DIARIO DE 
SESIONES DEL CONGRESO DE LOS DIPUTADOS, núm. 169, 8432–46 (Apr. 6, 2006). 
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centers or in homes are authorized to leave the place to attend 
religious worship). The solution is expected to include paying 
religious ministers for their services with state funds, as is done with 
Catholic chaplains.61 
4. State economic cooperation with religious denominations 
This type of cooperation is channeled especially through three 
legal instruments: tax exemptions for religious denominations, tax 
benefits for donations made to religious entities by individuals or by 
corporations, and direct economic aid. In the two first categories, 
there has been a gradual and clear convergence of the scheme 
designed for the Catholic Church and the one applicable to 
Protestants, Jews, and Muslims. However, the only beneficiary of 
direct economic aid from the State has traditionally been the 
Catholic Church. 
The current system is called “tax assignment” (asignación 
tributaria), which gives taxpayers the option of allocating 0.5239 
percent of their income tax to the economic maintenance of the 
Catholic Church; taxpayers express their will in that regard every year 
when filling out the relevant forms for the Spanish Internal Revenue 
Service and the money is administered by the Bishops’ Conference. 
Because of flaws in the effective functioning of the system, the 
Ministry of Justice is currently studying a possible revision.62 One of 
the alternatives under consideration is raising the percentage of the 
income tax that taxpayers can freely assign, as the Bishops’ 
Conference insists that the current percentage is insufficient. Another 
important change under study is the possible extension of tax 
 
 61. The Ministry of Justice is currently studying a possible regulation on Protestant, 
Jewish, and Islamic religious assistance in penitentiaries (and perhaps in other public centers). 
See LOS ACUERDOS CON LAS CONFESIONES MINORITARIAS: DIEZ AÑOS DE VIGENCIA (Joaquín 
Mantecón ed., 2003) [hereinafter DIEZ AÑOS DE VIGENCIA] (explaining issues related to the 
practical application of the 1992 Agreements). This volume gathers several papers requested by 
the previous government’s Ministry of Justice from university professors who were members of 
the Advisory Commission on Religious Freedom. It had the aim of studying proposals of 
possible reforms of the provisions contained in the 1992 Agreements with the Evangelical, 
Jewish, and Islamic federations. Along with those papers, the book also transcribes the 
comments written by other members of the Advisory Commission. Those addressed by the 
representatives of the religious federations are particularly interesting, for they provide the 
perspective of the people to whom the agreements are applied. The materials of that volume 
constituted, and still constitute under the current government, a source of reflection for the 
legislative reforms under study. 
 62. See id. 
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assignment to the religious federations that signed the 1992 
Agreements. Those federations initially rejected the system when the 
government offered it during negotiations but have recently 
expressed interest in its availability, or at least in receiving some sort 
of direct economic aid from the State.63 While the necessary changes 
in tax laws are affected, the current government has decided to erect 
a public foundation named “Pluralism and Coexistence” (Pluralismo 
y Convivencia) that aims to provide public financial support to 
Protestant, Jewish, and Islamic federations through funding activities 
relating to education, culture, or social integration. Curiously 
enough, this new way of providing economic aid to major religious 
minorities in Spain has similarities to the old system of budgetary 
funding (dotación presupuestaria) applied to the Catholic Church. 
Under this system, part of the State budget was reserved every year 
for the expenses of “worship and clergy.” Significantly, both the 
Holy See and the Spanish State, in the 1979 Agreement on 
Economic Affairs, thought it preferable to abandon the budgetary 
funding system, understanding that it was less adequate for the new 
political era that was opening in Spain.64 
 
 63. The Islamic federation was always in favor of the tax assignment system. 
Nevertheless, because they joined the negotiation process of the 1992 Agreements after the 
Protestants and Jews, they had to accept the refusal expressed by the Protestants and Jews 
because the government was determined not to distinguish between the three federations in 
this area. Recently, the Evangelical and Islamic federations have declared that they are in favor 
of adopting the tax assignment. On the contrary, the Jewish federation has blatantly opposed 
receiving money from the state via tax assignment and prefers other channels of direct state 
funding that do not require citizens to provide personal and signed statements. See id. at 152–
53, 192–94, 213. The alleged reason is the distrust that many Jews have of identifying 
themselves as such, due to their memory of the perverse historical use of Jewish censuses in 
many countries in the past. Obviously, recent anti-Semitic movements in various countries will 
not help to reduce that distrust. These movements are more significant in Spain than one 
might think at first glance. See Eugenia Relaño Pastor, España contra el antisemitismo, racismo, 
xenofobia y otras formas de intolerancia: una panorámica general, 9 REVISTA GENERAL DE 
DERECHO CANÓNICO Y DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO 1 (2005), available at 
www.iustel.com. 
 64. See Acuerdo sobre Asuntos Económicos, Jan. 3, 1979, pmbl., art. II (Instrumento de 
ratificación of Dec. 4, 1979, B.O.E. Dec. 15, 1979). The Foundation Pluralismo y 
Convivencia was constituted by the Ministry of Justice on January 25, 2005, and registered via 
the Order ECI/935/2005, Mar. 8, 2005 (B.O.E. 2005). See Carmen Garcimartín Montero, 
Direct Financing of Religious Denominations in Spain, 48 J. CHURCH & ST. 175 (2006) 
(analyzing this foundation in light of the diverse systems of state aid to religion in Spain). 
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V. TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER 
What can we say twenty-five years after the enactment of the 
Organic Law on Religious Freedom? A general judgment would 
likely lead us to affirm that the system it set up has functioned 
reasonably well in the context of comparative law. However, no legal 
system of church-state relations is perfect; perfection in the law is not 
easily attainable. 
As a matter of fact, several religious denominations have raised a 
series of grievances and claims. It is natural that churches and 
religious communities—particularly those attentive to manifestations 
of the principle of state cooperation—tend to defend their legitimate 
interests and, consequently, put more emphasis on the system’s 
deficiencies than on its achievements. Though it is useful to listen to 
their voices—for they may point out imperfection in our system, thus 
facilitating its potential improvement—we must not let them 
condition our perspective of analysis. Our examination must 
necessarily be broader, as we move away from realizing only the 
negative aspects of Spanish law on religion. 
For example, the Catholic Church sometimes complains about 
not receiving enough economic aid from the state, including funds 
for the preservation of its historic patrimony, which constitutes an 
essential part of Spanish cultural heritage. It also complains about 
continuous reforms on the financing schemes for private Catholic 
schools, as well as the juridical rules governing religious education in 
public schools (not excepting the controversial issue of religion 
teachers’ legal status, allegedly to the detriment of the provisions of 
the 1979 Agreement on Education and Cultural Affairs).65 It also 
worries about the removal of Christian symbols from public places or 
ceremonies. Finally, the Catholic Church is concerned about laws 
that are said to undermine moral values of Christian origin, especially 
in the areas of family and bioethics, which the Church deems vital for 
the correct functioning of a secular society.66 
It is not my intention to judge here the merits of those 
reproaches, but the facts perhaps reveal a social panorama more 
 
 65. Acuerdo sobre Enseñanza y Asuntos Culturales, Jan. 3, 1979 (Instrumento de 
ratificación of Dec. 4, 1979, B.O.E. Dec. 15, 1979). Religious teaching in public schools is 
regulated in Articles I-VIII of the Agreement. 
 66. See The Bishops’ Conference, http://www.conferenciaepiscopal.es (last visited July 
22, 2006) (detecting the main concerns of Spanish Catholic hierarchy). 
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optimistic for the Catholic Church. In an era of de-Christianization 
in the entire Western world and in Europe in particular, 81% of 
Spanish citizens declare themselves Catholic.67 The vast majority of 
parents demand Catholic religious education in private and public 
schools.68 A significant percentage of marriages are celebrated 
according to the form and rules of canon law,69 and a high 
percentage of children born in Spain are baptized in the Catholic 
Church.70 We are also witnessing an extraordinary flourishing of 
non-profit organizations of explicit or implicit Catholic inspiration 
that carry out numerous and significant works of social assistance, 
inside and outside Spain. In other words, it appears that the change 
in the Spanish State’s approach from confessionality to neutrality has 
not had such negative consequences for the Catholic Church in 
Spain. It is true that the Church’s institutional presence in public life 
has decreased, but its social influence continues to be enormous. 
On the other hand, the religious federations that are the 
beneficiaries of 1992 Agreements—Protestants, Jews, and Muslims—
complain about what they deem is unjustified and discriminatory 
legal treatment in comparison with the Catholic Church. They refer, 
above all, to some aspects of State economic cooperation, to 
religious education in public schools, to religious assistance in 
military establishments, hospitals or penitentiaries, and to the lesser 
civil effects of their religious marriage (in particular, the irrelevance 
 
 67. See Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Center of Sociological Research), 
http://www.embusa.es/religiousfreedomsp2004.html (last visited July 22, 2006) (affirming 
the data). 
 68. During the 2004–2005 academic year, 72.2% of the students in public schools 
opted for Catholic religious education. The percentage is still higher in private non-religious 
schools: 81.7%. And, naturally, the percentage is much higher in Catholic schools: 99.5%. 
From the total number of students in pre-university education, approximately two-thirds 
attend public schools and one-third attend private schools (the immense majority of which are 
Catholic). See Episcopal Commission for Teaching and Catechesis within the Spanish Bishops’ 
Conference, http://www.conferenciaepiscopal.es/actividades/2005/febrero_14.htm (last 
visited July 22, 2006). 
 69. The approximate proportion is four to three in favor of civil marriages compared to 
canonical marriages, according to the data of 2000, obtained from the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística (National Institute of Statistics), http://www.ine.es/inebase/index.html (last 
visited July 22, 2006). On January 14, 2003, the Catholic news agency Zenit provided similar 
data based on information from the Bishops’ Conference. See Zenit, www.zenit.org (last visited 
July 22, 2006). 
 70. In 2000 there were 283,226 christenings out of 397,632 births. See Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística (National Institute of Statistics), http://www.ine.es/inebase/ 
index.html (last visited July 22, 2006). 
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of the decisions of Jewish and Islamic courts on the nullity and 
dissolution of marriages).71 
Again, this is not the right context to deliver a detailed judgment 
on the merits of those complaints, but, undoubtedly, Spain’s legal 
order still needs a certain fine-tuning with respect to the application 
of the equality principle. At the same time, however, it is also true 
that those major religious minorities never enjoyed, in all of Spain’s 
history, the level of freedom and State cooperation that they enjoy 
now. This includes, of course, the matters regulated by the 1992 
Agreements. Moreover, we should remember that they have specific 
institutional channels of dialogue and negotiation with the State; 
namely, the creation of mixed commissions for the development and 
control of the 1992 agreements72 and the right to appoint, as 
representatives of their respective federations, members of the 
Advisory Commission on Religious Freedom in the Ministry of 
Justice, which must give an opinion on every government initiative 
relating to the application of the LOLR.73 We should not lose sight 
of the fact that the current Spanish system, notwithstanding all its 
possible limitations or deficiencies, has placed the Protestant, Jewish, 
and Islamic religions in the best legal position they have ever had in 
Spanish history.74 
Other minority religious denominations registered with the 
Registry of Religious Entities, and therefore having juridical 
personality in Spanish law, argue that they do not benefit from the 
principle of State cooperation, for it is, in practice, reserved to the 
churches or religious communities that have reached a formal 
agreement according to LOLR article 7. In other words, they affirm 
 
 71. See generally DIEZ AÑOS DE VIGENCIA, supra note 61. See also LÓPEZ ALARCÓN & 
NAVARRO-VALLS, supra note 57. For the rest, any good textbook of “ecclesiastical law of the 
state” (derecho eclesiástico del Estado) should provide an overview of the legal status of religious 
denominations in Spain. See, e.g., DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL ESTADO (Rafael Navarro-Valls 
& Javier Martínez-Torrón eds.), available at www.iustel.com; DERECHO ECLESIÁSTICO DEL 
ESTADO ESPAÑOL (Javier Ferrer Ortiz ed., 2004). 
 72. See Third Additional Disposition of the Agreements with the Protestant, Jewish and 
Islamic federations. 
 73. See LOLR, supra note 6, art. 8(2). 
 74. It is significant, perhaps, that Spain has hardly experienced any of the problems 
concerning the use of religious garments or symbols in schools that have recently emerged in 
other European countries, especially with regard to Islam. See paragraphs 55 through 65 of 
Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, an important decision made in the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights on November 10, 2005, for a glimpse into the attitude of diverse 
European legal systems on the use of the Islamic headscarf in schools. 
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that their registration as religious denominations does not grant 
them any specific guarantee or support in comparison with ordinary 
associations under civil law. In their view, this is discriminatory, 
especially taking into account the fact that some of them have more 
members than many of the single churches included in the 1992 
Agreements.75 
I must admit that this is a powerful argument76 that moves us to 
face what probably is the most visible deficiency of Spain’s system of 
relations between state and religion: the application of the equality 
principle to religious denominations. The same argument also 
suggests the necessity of revising the current configuration of the 
Registry of Religious Entities. This, because of its scarce relevance, 
seems to be in a sort of sterile “no man’s land,” halfway between a 
system lacking controls and respecting the spontaneity of religious 
social life (Anglo-American style) and a system of true control 
conceived as an efficient instrument to select the groups deserving to 
benefit from State cooperation. In any event, we should bear in 
mind, once again, that minority religions, whatever their social 
rooting, have reached a freedom of activity that was unimaginable 
not many years ago. And they also have—as far as they are 
recognized as having well-known roots in Spanish society—the 
possibility of negotiating, under LOLR article 7, a formal 
cooperation agreement with the State, thus reaching a higher legal 
status.77 
Finally, there are still some groups that declare themselves 
religious and claim that the State has failed to recognize their 
religious nature and has consequently denied them access to the 
Registry of Religious Entities. Some cases have attracted the 
attention of public opinion, especially the ones regarding the 
 
 75. We should bear in mind that the three Agreements of 1992 were concluded with 
three federations of religious communities and not with single churches. For example, the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and Jehovah’s Witnesses each have more members 
than the entirety of all Jewish communities in Spain. 
 76. See MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, supra note 21, at 139–45, 184–95; DIEZ AÑOS DE 
VIGENCIA, supra note 61, at 111–19, 132–38. 
 77. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. Until now, apart form the three 
federations that signed 1992 Agreements, only the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
has been recognized as having well-known roots. However, there are no visible signs revealing 
that the government is prepared to negotiate a cooperation agreement with the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. 
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Unification Church and the Church of Scientology, both of which 
have more or less spread in other countries. 
With respect to these claims, groups that have been refused 
registration as religious entities certainly can obtain legal personality 
in civil law with virtually the same effects through registration as 
ordinary associations. However, in a country that has a preference for 
registries and in which religion continues to have a remarkable 
influence, it is important for some groups to be recognized as a 
religion by the State. Such recognition provides them a certain “aura 
of respectability” that constitutes a distinctive element from common 
associations. In any event, we should not forget a significant decision 
of the Spanish Constitutional Court on the issue of registration 
regarding a claim (recurso de amparo) filed by the Unification 
Church.78 Despite criticism of that decision because of evident flaws 
and ambiguity in its rationale, the Court openly held that the 
Registry of Religious Entities is obliged to follow more flexible 
criteria of admission and that State officials are not permitted either 
to exercise a rigorous control on the religious nature of applicant 
groups or to use for that purpose a concept of religion rooted in 
Western history.79 However, the actual influence of this 
Constitutional Court decision on administrative praxis is 
questionable; significantly, the Church of Scientology, whose 
registration raised controversial issues similar to those of the 
Unification Church, was again recently denied the right to register as 
a religious denomination.80 
VI. SOME REFLECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The preceding observations reveal that the Spanish system of 
church-state relations, though reasonable overall, is certainly 
 
 78. Spanish Constitutional Court, STC, Feb. 15, 2001 (S.T.C., No. 46). 
 79. See Javier Martínez-Torrón, Freedom of Religion in the Case Law of the Spanish 
Constitutional Court, 2001 BYU L. REV. 711, 742–46. 
 80. According to the data on file in the Ministry of Justice, the refusal of Scientology’s 
application for registration was decided by the Permanent Commission of the Advisory 
Commission on Religious Freedom on February 3, 2005 (the issue was not submitted to the 
Plenary Commission for decision; this was the third time Scientology applied to be registered; 
the two first applications date back to March 28, 1983, and December 6, 1983). Spanish 
courts, however, seem to have been more receptive to the Constitutional Court’s doctrine, as 
demonstrated by the decision Audiencia Nacional (Sala de lo Contencioso-Administrativo) of 
April 21, 2005, in favor of the Self-Realization Fellowship Church, which had been denied 
registration for allegedly lacking religious aims. 
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perfectible. Indeed, the current socialist government has inherited 
from the previous conservative government an interest in revising, 
and probably in reforming, diverse aspects of Spanish law on 
religion, including the Organic Law on Religious Freedom itself, as 
well as the regulation of the Registry of Religious Entities, which has 
shown more and more deficiencies over the last decade. Although 
the perspectives of the two governments differ in many aspects, they 
seem to coincide on a significant point: the timing of legislative 
revision. Neither government has shown great impatience to 
conclude it. This fact may express a certain degree of satisfaction 
with the status quo, so high and widely spread that only some 
scholars and some religious minorities, representing a small 
percentage of the population, actually insist upon those legislative 
modifications. Or perhaps it is just an expression of conformism in 
view of the difficulties to effect legislative amendments in this area. 
Part of the problem derives from the difficulty of isolating 
individual issues that can be reformed without reconsidering the 
entire conception of the system. Probably, as indicated before, the 
most important concrete questions relate to the application of the 
equality principle. But to solve these questions adequately would 
lead to an assessment of how consistent the principle of equality is 
with a system of church-state relations based upon the notion that 
the State recognizes diverse levels of religious denominations 
depending on their social roots, with the consequence that a 
different legal status—especially with regard to state cooperation—
corresponds to each level. In other words, we would need to 
evaluate whether the Spanish multi-tier system of church-state 
relations is totally compatible with our constitutional concept of 
equal justice, taking into account that almost all manifestations of 
State cooperation (and undoubtedly the main ones) are reserved to 
those confessions that have been deemed to “deserve” a formal 
cooperation agreement with the state after being recognized as 
having “well-known roots” in Spanish society. 
This, indeed, poses some conceptual questions from the 
perspective of equality and State neutrality. On the one hand, it does 
not seem justifiable that the number of adherents of a religion 
conditions forms of state cooperation when this cooperation is 
supposed to be founded, in principle, on the religious nature of a 
group and not on its size. Tax exemptions and the civil effects of 
religious marriage ceremonies—both reserved to the religious 
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denominations that have reached an agreement with the state—are 
two examples of this anomaly. On the other hand, although 
differences between tiers of religious denominations only affect, in 
theory, state cooperation, in practice they often result in diverse 
degrees of actual freedom and “social respectability.” This can be of 
significance in a State constitutionally obliged to actively promote 
public freedoms81 and in a society accustomed to believing that a 
higher degree of state recognition entails stronger proof of moral 
acceptability. We could still add that access to the maximum level of 
cooperation—formal cooperative agreements with the state—is 
governed by rules written in ambiguous terms, which grant an 
excessive margin of discretion to public authorities (in particular to 
the executive power). 
In spite of the foregoing, we must not lose historical perspective 
when analyzing the Spanish church-state system. An historic 
understanding is necessary to avoid unjust judgments on the past 
and to facilitate an accurate assessment of the key elements that may 
serve as orientation for future legislative reforms. In this respect, it is 
worth reiterating that in the last twenty-five years, religion has ceased 
to be, for the first time in our history, a cause of serious social and 
political conflict. In retrospect, there have been, no doubt, tensions 
between public authorities and religious denominations, especially 
the Catholic Church and, more recently, Islamic communities. It is 
inevitable that political tension emerges occasionally in the context 
of church-state relations, such as the one prevailing in the Occident, 
which has been expressively described as a “frontier system”82 and is 
characterized by an acceptance of the reciprocal autonomy of civil 
and religious society. However, the last quarter of a century has 
witnessed a situation of stable “religious peace” in Spain, together 
with a protection of freedom of religion or belief we had not known 
before, because Spain adopted its constitutional principles on 
religion by a large social and political consensus.83 This fact deserves 
 
 81. See C.E., supra note 6, art. 9(2); see also supra text accompanying note 55. 
 82. See RAFAEL NAVARRO-VALLS & RAFAEL PALOMINO, ESTADO Y RELIGIÓN: TEXTOS 
PARA UNA REFLEXIÓN CRÍTICA 10 (2d ed. 2003). 
 83. This distinguishes Spain from other countries, such as France and the United States, 
whose fundamental principles on church-state relations have become a myth with the passage 
of time, despite the fact that they generated a strong division in society at the time of their 
adoption and for a long time afterwards. See generally CHÉLINI-PONT & GUNN, supra note 14 
(commenting on an historical revision of the principles of laïcité in France and of religious 
freedom in the U.S.). 
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a positive evaluation, for it has proven essential for the consolidation 
of democracy in Spain. The benefits are evident: for the state, for the 
citizens of any faith (or of no faith), and for religious denominations, 
not excluding the Catholic Church, which has lost certain historical 
privileges but possesses more authentic autonomy now than in the 
times of traditional confessional monarchy or under Franco’s regime. 
I would like to conclude by emphasizing that Spain has not 
reached this situation through a system of strict separation between 
Church and State or through the privileged support to the major 
religion that is typical of a confessional State. Rather, Spain has 
accomplished this through a system in which State neutrality has 
been understood as compatible with an active cooperation with 
religious denominations. This compatibility has been perhaps the 
most crucial factor in the success of the Spanish system of relations 
between state and religion. The success of the system is manifested 
not only in the creation of a correct formal framework for the 
protection of religious freedom, but also in the transformation—in 
just a few years—of the way that Spaniards approach religious 
diversity, intellectually as well as emotionally. It is important to bear 
this in mind with a view to the future. If Spain follows the right 
policy, its society, which is gradually becoming more pluri-religious 
and pluri-cultural, is not necessarily destined to become more 
conflictive. 
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